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1God　and　E叫）tirbess：Cause，　Reasons，　and　the　World’s　Abyss
　　　　　【Forms　of　Panentheism　in　Religion　and　Naturel“
Tokiyuki　Nobuhara
　　　　In　speaking　of　the　theme　of‘‘God　and　Emptiness”within　the
context　of‘‘the　dialogue　betw㏄n　science　and　religion　abOut　creation
and　natUre血view　of　questions　abOut　causality　and　detemlination”like
we　do　in　this　conference，1　think　one　of　the　most　important　issues　to　be
considered　is　the　relationship　between　God’s　causality　and　God’s
omnipotencelomniscience．　I　have　come　up　with　this　issue　at　the　end　of
my　recent　article　entitled‘‘How　Can　We　Co－ordinate　the　Vertica1　Order
to　the　Horizonta1　Order，　and　vice　versa，　in　Metaphysics　Cogendy？：Uwe
Meixner，　kocess　Thought，　and　Nishida－tetsuga㎞”which　I　wrote　fbr
the　philosophy　joumal“Polylo9”1（Vienna）．1　have　been　particulary
attentive　to　Uwe　Meixner’s　following　dictUm　which　is　crucia1　for　his
“Metaphysics　of　Event　and　Substance．”He　wdtes：
The　laws　of　nature，　the　regularities　that　make　up　the　order　of　the
world，　totally　penetrating　it，　come丘om　his［God’s】choice（which
must　fbr　this　reason　be　a　completely　forseeing　one）．　Hence　the
nomologically　constraining　character　of止e　laws　of　nature　is　not
objective　in　itself（as　naturalists　think），　it　is，　however，
objectively　given　by　GOd．　The　necessity　that　they　carry　with　them
（the㎜舵of　ancient　metaphysics）does　not　exist　in　itself　without
Idation　to　an　agent　but　is　rooted　in　God’s　causality　and　gains　its
constrahi血g　character　and　its　character　of　partly　pre－determining
the　fUture　from　his　omnipotence　and　omniscience．la・・
　　　　1　basically　affirm　what　is　implied血血s　dic㎜一一although　from　my
own　perspective　of　what　I　might　ca皿aBuddhist－Chdstian　ph皿osophy
based　upOn　t　le　thought　of　A血ed　Nomh　Whitehead　and　Kitaro　Nishida．
At　any　rate，　what　is　impOrtant　for　us　at　this　eafly　stage　of　my　1ectUre　is
to　discem　that　when　we　speak　of　the　theme　of‘‘God　and　Emp血ess”
wi血i血the　context　of‘℃the　dialogue　betWeen　science　and　re血gion　about
2creation，”we　basically　concern　ourselves　with　the　whence　andlor
whither　question（s）regarding　the　problem　of‘‘creation”in　temls　of
God’s　omnipotence！omniscience　and　also　with　the　how　question
regarding　the　process　of‘‘creatioガ’in　terms　of　causality（God’s
causa血ty　included）．　We　also　have　to　discern　how　these　two　issues　are
interrelated　in　the　midst　of　the　problem　of“creation．”
　　　The　f廿st　issue，　dea血1g　with　the　whence　and！br　whither　of　whatever
actually　is　in　the　universe，　is　a　properly　metaphysical　or　ontological
olle，　while　the　second　issue，　accounting　fbr　how　all　creation　comes　into
being　in　the　universe，　is　a　cosmological　one．　In　any　metaphysical
system，　whether　it　is　Christian　or　Buddhist　or　whatever，　one　has　to　end
up　with　some　sort　of　answer　regardillg　the　first　question　while
discussing　the　second　question．　And　in　so　doing　one　is　necessarily
required　to　show　the　way　in　which　dle∬rst，　ontological　question　is
answered　appropriately　in　cor跡espondence　to　the　second，　cosmological
question；namely，　the　third　issue　is　something　like　what　Paul　Tillich
wanted　to　pursue　in　terms　of　his　notion　of　systematic山eology，　in血e
sense　of　considering　the　problem　hlherent　in　the　situation　by　the　method
of　comelatioll　from　his　overa皿viewpoint　of　the　Christian　message．
　　　　However，　there　is　one　cr　lcia1　difference　from　Tillich’s　endeavor　of
systematic　theology　in　our　theme　with　which　I　am　about　to　struggle：
i．e．，‘‘God　and　Emptiness．”Iam　not　presupposing，　like　TiUich　does，　the
notion　of　God　or　the　Christian　message　as　the　sole　answer　to　the
existential　questions　challenging　us（C㎞stians）from　within　the　givell
situation　of　humanity（i．e．，　the　human　predicament）．　This　is　b㏄ause
what　is　presented　before　us（Christians）in　the　form　of　Buddhist
Emptiness　is　not　merely　an　exist6ntial　question　but　is　properly　an
answer，　which　is　important　in　its　own　right　religiously　cum
metaphysically．　Accordingly，　in　our　age　of　dialogue　between
Buddhism　and　Christianity，　at　whose　coming　Tillich　has　had　an
insightf巴1　glallce　while　writing　Christianity　and　the　Encounter｛）f　the
World　Rel’8’ons　and　Syste〃mtic　7heolo8y，　Vol．3in　1963，　the　message
is　both　Christian　and　Buddhist．　But　the　problem　is　how　so？
　　　　111what　follows　let　me　discuss　three　things　from　the　above－
mentioned　th【eefbld　perspective，　ontological－cosmologica1－systematic：
｛；oda田IE幽（la囮囮ら1晦圃0踵∋㎜A馳脚四㎜dr互一h1恥8■虚触引　3
fmst，　Charles　Hartshorne’s　case　of　metaphysics　in　which　what　he　ca皿s
the‘‘Zero　Fallacy”is　bitterly　repudiated；s㏄ond，　Kitaro　Nishida’s　case
of　Buddhist　metaphysics　in　which　the　place　of　absolute　Nothingness　is
subsu血ing　everything　ultmately　affi　natively；and血ird，　my　own　idea
of　a　Buddhist－C㎞stian　philosophy　in　which　the　notion　of　God　as　the
principle　of　loyalty　in　the　universe　is　playing　a　pivota1，　mediati皿g　role．
1・　The　Case　of⊂haries　Harヒshorne：The　Zero　Fallacy
　　　　Repudiated　and　Panentheism／Surrelativism　Arnrmed
　　　　In　my　1998　paper“Hartshome　and　Nishida：Re－Envisioning　the
Absolute．　Two　Types　of　Panenthism　vs．　Spinoza’s　Pantheism”（now
readable　at　http：〃www．bu．edu／wcp！Papers；hereafter　cited　as　HNRA）I
argued　fbr　Hartshorne’s　case　of　panelltheism　in　comparison　with
Nishida，s．　I　wrote：
Ha【tshome’s　re－envisioning　of　the　notion　of　the　Absolute　has　been
carried　out　in　his　thesis，　called　Surrelativism，　also　Panentheism．
Its　main　content，　according　to　him，　is　as　fbllows：‘‘the‘relative’or
changeable，　that　which　depends　upon　and　varies　with　varying
relationships，　includes　within　itself　and　in　value　exceeds　the
nourelative，㎞umble，㎞de卿dent，　or‘absolute，’磯concre肥
includes　and　exceeds　the　abstract．”2From　this　doctrine　it　follows，
as　Hartshome㎞er　maintains，　that“God，　as　supremely　excellent
and　concrete，　must　be　conceived　not　as　wholly　absolute　or
immutable，　but　rather　as　supremely－relative，‘surrelative，’
although，　or　because　of　this　superior　relativity，containing　an
abstract　character　or　essence　in　respect　to　which，　but　only　in
respect　to　whic鵡　he　is　indeed　strictly　absolute　and　immutable”
（DR，　ix）．（HNRA，2）
　　　　As　is　evident　above，　as　I　further　argued，　Hartshorne’s　re－
envision血g　of　the　notion　of　the　Absolute　takes　place　only　by　way　of
puUing　it　within　the　context　of　God　as‘‘supremely－relative．”In血is
sense，　in　order　to　re－enVision　the　concept　of　the　Absolute，　Hartshorne
necessarily　needs　this‘‘supremely－relative”context　as　that　which
4includes　within　itself　the　Absolute　and電he　universe　as　a　whole　together．
This，　I　beHeve，　is　what　he　means　when　he　writes　as　fbllows：
．．．if　the　ul血verse　is　eminently　a1血ate　and　rational，　then　either　it　is
God，　or　there　are　two　eminent　beings，　God　and　Universe，　and　a
曲dsupereminent　entity，　which　is　the　total　reality　of　God－and－
universe．　The　dilemma　is　satisfactorily　dissolved　only　by　the
admission　that　the　GOd　who　creates　and　the　inclusive　creation　are
one　God．（DR，79）
　　　　As　1　ascertt血ed血rther，　in　saying　so　Hartshorne　is　distinguishing
his　own　standpoint　of‘‘panentheism”（which　is　the　view　that‘‘deity　is　in
some　real　aspect　distinguishable　from　and　independent　of　any　and　all
relative　items，　and　yet，　taken　as　an　actual　whole，　inclUdes　alhelative
items”）丘om　traditional　theism　or　deism（which　makes　God‘‘solely
independent　or　nonrelative”）and－also　from“palltheism”of　Spinoza’s
type（which　is　the　view　that‘‘deity　is　the　all　of　relative　or
interdependent　items，　with　nothing　wholly　independent　or　ill　any　clear
sense　nonrelative”）（DR，89－90）．　Significantly　enough，　in　tbis　ma㎜er
Hartshorne　breaks血rough　an　impasse　of　one－sidedness　peculiar　not
only　to　the　standpoint　of　traditional　theism　cente血g　around　the　notion
of　the　nonrelative　Absolute　but　to　Spinoza’s　pantheism　based　upon　the
vision　of　reality　as　the　nonindependent，　solely　relative　deity
coterminous　with　nature，　namely　deus　sive　natUra．
　　　　Hartshorne’s　all－inclusive，　surrelativistic，　panentheistic
metaphysics，　as　mentioned　above，　however，　does　not　speak　of　the
whence　but・only　of　the　whither　of　the　universe　insof訂as　the　Deity　fbr
him　is　at　once　the　personal　God　and　the　ulliverse　in　that　the
asymmetrical　ongoing　process　of　the　universe　is　ever－1astingly　to　be
contained　in　and　understood　by　the　Deity．　In　this　sense，　the　Deity　is　the
goal　of　the　ever－growing　Hartshomean　universe．　It　may　be　because　of
this　characteristic　of　his　metaphysics　that　Hartshorne　takes　up　the
problem　of‘‘appearance”and㎞her　argues　that‘‘the　absolute，　simply
as　such，　may　be　temled　the　appearance　of　ultimate　reality　to　abstract
cognition，　including　the　divine　self－cognition　in　its　abstract　aspect”
God劉ndE晦C鴫臨亀圏邑壷reWdid！sAl蟹yss　EJimns（fP幽hl幽o臨80己㎞聾5
ΦR，83）．hl　sllorI，　his　metaphysics　is　rather　static　on　the　conceptual
side，　strangely　enough，　to　my　mind，　while，　however，　vividly　dynamic
on　the－all－inclusive“認傭π1”side，　as　is　well㎞own．
　　　　In　Hartshorne’s　all－inclusive　metaphysics　what　is　mediating
betWeen　ontology（i．e．，　Surrelativism）and　cosmology（i．e．，　Panentheism
as血e　logic　of　containment　of　a皿past　entities　in　the　universe　into　the
bosom　of　the　Deity）is　the　idea　of　a　unique　iden面cation　of　the　two，
thus　entailillg　the　above－mentioned　grasp　of　the　problem　of
“appearance．”By　contrast，　for　Whitehead，“appearance”is　co－
tem血ous　with　the　notion　of‘‘concrescence”which　happens　only　in
conformation　to　the　Reality．31t　seems　to　me　that　something　is
blockading　the　dynamic，　conceptual　passage　of　the　Deity　into　its
㎞emost　dep血s　in　HIロ柚ome’s　mind．　Does　this　have　something　to　do
with　his　repudiation　of‘‘a　merely　infinite　God”（in　the　sense　of　a　mere
negadon　of血e　finite，　which　is　at　the　core　of　what　he　terms山e“Zero
Fallacy”）as“an　intellectual　form　of　idolatry”？That　is　a　problem．
　　　　This　problem　is　manifest，　if　my　observadon　is　correct　and　to　the
point，　when　he　discloses：
‘‘cepelldent　origination”and　the　goal　of　bringing　all　things　to
Bud曲ahood　suggest　asymmetry，　but血e　reladon　of血s　to血vana
is　sheer　mystery，　so　f註as　I　can　s㏄．4
It　is　usually　supPosed，　as　I　noted　already　seventeen　years　ago，　that
Buddhism　is　a　process　view　of　reality．　To　be　sure，　its　t】肚ee　key
categories－transience（Pali，　aniccの；suffe血g（伽妖加）；and．No－mind
（anatta）一一suggest　that　view．　But　it　i串　to　be　remembered，　I　argued，　that
Buddhism　upholds　a　process　view　of　rea血ty　p血iarily　under　the　aspect
of　Method．　And　I　wrote：
That　is　to　say，　it　speaks　of　the（acion－）process　of　Becoming
（ka〃z〃ta－bhava）in　its　terribly　negativistic　sense　only　to　drive
humans　to　Awakening　or　Nirvalla．　Therefbre，　for　Buddhism　the
use　of　process　language　is　genuinely　soteriologica1．　If　we　adllered，
1ike　Hartshorne　did，　to　a　process　view　of　reality血roughout，　we
6would　have　to　depart　from　Buddhism　at　the　very　end，　namely，　at
the　most　crucial　occasion　of　attaining　Nirvana．5
For　what　is　needed　there，　I　now　th血此，　would　probably　be，　if　expressed
in　Christian　terms，　a　repu醐on（as面s眺es　pla㏄wi曲the　imer　life
of　the　Godhead　befbre　taking　place　in　us）of‘‘a　merely　infinite　God　plus
amerely　finite　UniVerSe．”
ll． The　Case　of　Kitaro　Nishida：the　Absolロte　Negated　within
the　Realm　of　the　Ultimate，　thus　Paradoxically　Tending　To
Be　Absolutely　A備rma輔ve　of　All　Creation
Now，　let　me　tum　to　the　case　of　Nishida．　As　I　noted　in　my　afore一
mentioned　Boston　paper，　in　his　last　essay　entitled‘The　Logic　of　Place
and　a　Religious　Worldview，”Nishida　reconsiders　the　notion　of　the
Absolute　based　upon　his　own　pec面ar　understanding　of　the　matter　of
religion　as　the　self　s　encounter　with　the　divine‘‘only　through　dying，”
thus　relating　to　the　divine　in　the　manner　of　an‘‘inverse
correspondence”（Jpn．，　gya」ku－taioo）。　And　I　wrote：
For　him，　conversely，　the　divine　dynamics　is　in　itself　operative，
inversely　correspondingly，　to　this　effbct：廿1at‘‘The　Absolute　is
血」yabsolute　by　facing　absolute　Nothingness，”hl　the　sense　that
‘‘狽??@Absolute　includes　in　itself　absolute　self－negation．”6
Evidently，　this　is　the　same　logic　as　Naga巾na’s　view　of　emptiness
emptying　itself，　as　I　examined　elsewhere．7　However，　wllat　is
unique　in　Nishida’s　case　is　the　fact　that　he　has　applied　this　logic　of
emptiness　emptying　itseif　or　of　the　Absolute　including　in　itself
absolute　self・negatio飢o　the　discursive　argument　fbr　the　existence
of　God，　as　I　argued　in　still　another　of　my　recent　articles．8　My
specific　concern　here　in　this　paper　is　with　seeing　how　the
Buddhistic　re－envisioning　of　the　notion　of　dle　Absolute　by　Nishida
can　and　actually　does　give　rise　to　his　own　version　of
‘‘垂≠獅?獅狽??奄唐香D”（HNRA，3）
Now，　as　is　clear　above，　what　is　mherent　in　Nishida’s　logic　of　the
GodxrilinPtmesu　C朗ら㎞鵬剛1伽Wd曲A晦野田㎝鵬dP㎞曲白mhR噸o編1己N㎞】7
place　of　absolute　Nothingness　is　the　negation　of　a　merely　abstract　idea
of　the　Absolute　like　the　one　depicted　by　Hartshorne．　in　Hartshorne’s
case，　as　we　have　already　ascertai！1ed，　there　has　occurred　a　radical
inclusion　of　the　Absohlte　within　the　context　of　the　inclusive　and
supreme　reality　which　is　pr㏄isely　the　personal　God－and血is　as　the
Deity’s　abstract　character．　By　contrast，　noticeably　enough，　Nishida
attacks　and　challenges　the　notion　of　the　Absolute　itself　ffom　within
itSeif，　thus　transfo血ng　itS　rea1　meaningfUlness　by　way　of　a　discursive
articulation　of　the　Buddhist　emp血ess　emptying　itself　into　a　unitary
one，　in　the　sense　of　the‘‘self－identity　of　absolute　con血・adicto】des，”that
is，　of　the　so－ca皿ed　Absolute　and　the　Relative．
　　　　In　other　words，　there　has　occurred　in　Nishida’s　philosophical　mi血d，
1et　me　emphasize，　a　new　perception（or　satori）of　the　Absolute　as　truly
signifying　the‘‘Between　the　so－called　Absolute　and　the　Relative．”Now
what　is　truly　Absolute　is　not　the　Absolute　itself　but　the　Between－ness　of
the　Absolute　in　close　relation　to　the　Relative　world　of　creatures．
However，　it　shoUld　be　noted　that血is　state　of　affairs　comes　out　to　be　so
only　from　witllin　the　realm　of　the　Absolute　as　such　insofar　as　the
Absolute　faces　its　own　self－negation　within　itself．　In　this　respect，
Nishida’s　logic　of　the　se】f－identity　of　absolute　contradictories（which，
incidentally，　is　his　version　of　the　logic　of　coincidentia　opPositorum），　or
of　the　place　of　absolute　Nothingness，　or　of　what　I　might　call　the
Between　the　so－ca皿ed　Absolute　and　the　Relative，　is　drastica皿y　dis血ct
from　Hartshorne’s　a皿。inclusive　logic　or　his　version　of　Panentheism．
　　　　It　is　conspicuous　that　Nishida　opts　for　his　argument　for　the
omnipotencelomniscience　of　God　only　from　here．　He　writes
beautifUlly：
B㏄ause　God，　as　the　se】f－negation　of　the　Absolute，　faces　GOdself　in
the　manner　of　an　inverse　correspondence　and　is　inclusive　of
absolute　self」negation　in　Godself，　therefore　God　exists　through
GOdseif．　Because　God　is　absolute　Nothillgness，　God　is　absoIute
Being．　Because　GOd　is　at　once　absolute　Nothingness　and　absolute
Being，　God　is　omnipotent　and　omniscient．　Therefore，　I　hold　that
because　there　is　Buddha，　there　are　sentient　beillgs，　and
8that　because　there　are　sentient　beings，　there　is　Buddha．　In
Christian　tems，　this　would　mean　that　because　there　is　God　the
Creator，　there　is　the　world　of　creatUres，　and　that　because　the】re　is
the　world　of　creatures，　there　is　GOd　the　Creator．
（Z6nshu，　M，398；trans．　mine）
He劃∋in　is　illvolved　what　I　might　call　a　metaphysical　revolution－one
sjm虹ar　to　the　case　of　A脆red　Nor血Whitehead’s　insight　into　the　nature
of‘‘creativity”as　devoid　of　its　own　character　and　actuahty　and　yet　as
lyillg　at　1血e　base　of　all　actual　entities．　I　think　I　can　explaill　what　is　at
issue　here　as　fbllows．　In　Nishida’s　logic　of　the　self」negation　of　the
Absolute，　the　realm　of　pure　potentiality（i．e．，　the　place　of　absolute
Nothingness）converts　itself，　ontologically，　into　the　rea11n　of　actuality
（i．e．，　the　world　of　creatures）simply　because　it　is，　in　Whiteheadian
conceptuality，　character－less　in　this　thoroughgoing　sense：you　just
cannot　take　the　characterlessness　to　mean　another　character；hence，
characterlessness　is　a　dynamism，　an　ongoing　movement，　which　is，　I
might　say，　a　veltical，　ontological　pr㏄ess　that　goes　beyond　and　above
1血e‘‘Zero　Fa皿acy．”Likewise，　you　can　authentica皿y　talk　about　the　in－
f㎞ite　insofar　as　you‘‘㏄ase　clinging”to　the　idea　of‘‘the血finite”as　if　it
were　the　fmite．　You　can　face　the　reality　of　the　in－finite　only　in　and
through　the　ongoing　act　of‘‘ceasing　clinging”to　the　idea　of　the血1finite・
Nthough　everyone　is　a　liar，　let・the・in－finite　be　proved　true！
　　　　It　is　precisely　along　these　lines　that　Nishida　attends　to　the　old
phrase　that　God　is‘‘nowhere　and　yet　everywhere　in　this　world”（Z8nshu，
XI，398）．　The‘‘nowhere”of　the　Deity　is　not　a‘‘somewhere”by　the
name　of‘‘nowhere”；hence，　it　is　necessarily　no－‘‘no－where，”that　is，
‘‘?魔?窒凾翌??窒?D”For　Nishid｛㌧it　is，　accordingly，　a　Christian　expression　of
廿1e　Bud（ihist　paradox　that　is　called　the　dial㏄tic　of‘‘is”and‘‘is　not”at
the　same　t㎞e（soku－hi）．　On　the　part　of　Buddhism　per　se，　this　dialectic
is　most　manifestly　expressed　in　these　terms　in　the　Diamond　Sutra：
Because　all　dharmas　are　not　all　dhamas，
Therefore　they　are　called　aU　dnarmas．
Because　there　is　no　Buddha，　there　is　Buddha；
God曲幽伽㎞幽W曲伽臨伽曲h脚圃闘9
Because　there　are　no　sentient　beings，　there　are　sentient　beings．
（ibid．，399）
Nishida　can　fmd　another　expression　of　this　same　dialectic　in　the　saying
of　the　Zen　master　Myocho（Daito　Ko㎞shi）：
Buddha　and　1，　distinct　tllrough　a　bi皿ion　kalpas　of　time，
Yet　not　separate　for　one　instant；
Facing　each　other　the　whole　day　through，
Yet　not　facing　each　other　fbr　an血stant．（ibld．）
　　　　What　is　discemible　in　these　two　Buddllist　sayings，　I　perceive，　is
the　appearance　here　and　now　of　the　Between　the　Absolute　and　the
Relative．　From　this　Buddhist　perspective　ef　the　BetWeen　covering　the
purely　potential　and　the　actual　and　concrete，　Nishida　asserts　that‘‘a　God
who　is　merely　transcendent　and　se】lf－sufficient　would　not　be　a　true
God”（ibid．）．　For　Nishida，　God　must　be　transcendent　and　at　the
same　time　immanent－an　argumellt　similar　to　Hartshorne’s
mentioned　earlier，　but　based　upon　a　different　ratonale．　In　the
immanent　aspect　of　tlle　Deity　God　is　a　thoroughgoing‘‘kenotic”
actuality　who　embraces“even　a　heinous　man”（Zenshu，　XI，404）－
and　this，　of　course，　not　because　God　condones　his　evil　but　because
God　envisages　his　whole　existence（evil　as　it　is）against　the
background　of　the　Between　as　that　which　connects　in　one　breath　the
unrealized　but　realizable　potentiality（i．e．，　the　Future）and　the
realized　actuality（i．e．，　the　present），　therefore　as　involving　in　itself
at　present　a　future　possibility　of　Enlightenment．9
量ll． How　Can　We　Conceive　of　the　loteπelatedness　of　Nishida’s
MetaphySkS　Of　the　When⊂e⊂Um　Ha眈ShOme’S　MetaphySiCS
of　the　Whither　to　the　Problem　of“⊂rea輔on”Cogently？：My
Thesis　of　God　as　the　Principle　of　Loyalty　in　the　Universe
Add「essed
Thus　far，　I　have　depicted　Hartshome’s　al1－inclusive　metaphysics　h1
tems　of　his　notion　of　Panentheism　or　Surrelativism　and　Nishda’s
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metaphysics　of　the　place　of　absolute　Nothingness　in　terms　of　his
notion　of　the　self－identitiy　of　absolute　contradictories，　such　as　the
Absolute　and　the　Relative．　Inasmuch　as　Hartshorne　finds　all　things
in　the　universe　as　contained　in　and　understood　by　the　consequent
nature　of　God　as　the　goal　of　the　universe，　I　might　designate　his
system　of　thought“metaphysics　of　the　Whither．”By　contrast，　I
might　call　Nishida’s　system　of　thought‘‘metaphysics　of　the
Whence”in　view　of　the　fact　that　he　is　primarily　concerned　with　re－
envisionillg　the　Absolute　as　including　in　itself　absolute　self－
negation，　thus　and　only　thus　tending　to　be　compassiomte　toward
even　a　heinous　man．
　　　　It　is　important　to　note　in　this　connection　that　in　Hartshome’s
case，　his　all－inclusive　metaphysics　presupposes　the　causal　efficacy
of　past　experiences　as　impinging　upon　the　present　experiellce（the
‘‘モ盾獅モ窒?唐モ?獅モ?hor　the　self－creative　activity　of　each　and　every
creature）which　is　then　to　be　understood　as　a　whole　by　the　Deity．
Accordingly，　he　does　not　seem　to　be　wanting　to　explain　it．　By
contrast，　in　the　case　of　Nishida’s　metaphysics　of　the　Whence　qua
the　place　of　absolute　Nothingness（which，　significantly　enough，　is
not　only　an　ontological　principle　but　also　an　explanatoly　principle），
it　is　important　to　note　that　this　metaphysics　provides　the　rationale　of
explicating　how　God’s　causality　is　enabled　to　function　by　God’s
omnipotencelomniscience，the　question　with　which　we　began　this
l㏄ture．
　　　　Now　1　would　1ike　to　point　out　that　it　is　precisely　in血is　connection
that　what　Nishida　says　in　his　s㏄ond　bOok　lntuitionαη4　Rφ6cだoηin
Self－Consciousne∬（1917）is　tremendously　impo血nt：‘‘When　absolute
丘ee　will　tums　and　views　itself，　or，　in　Boehme’s　terms，　when　the
objectless　will　looks　back　on　itSelf，　the　infinite　creative　development　of
this　world　is　set　up．”101n　my　rendering　of　Nishida（which　I　have　come
up　with　in　my　recent　article　mentioned　at　the　outset），　this　means　that
God’s　seeing　into　God’s　own　nature　or　the　Godhead－that　is，　God’s
supreme　satori－might　be　designated　as　the　very　thing　that　gave　rise　to
the　big　bang，　namely，　the　fh’st　fluctuation　in　the【etemal］universe．　In
my　opinion，　this　is　the　case　of　God’s　loyalty，　as　it　is　cosmologica皿y
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significant　in　this　context，　to　the　Godhead（in　the　sense　of　the　intra－
Trinitarian　relationa血ty，　pen’choresis，　which　is　to　be　designated，　as　by
Meister　Eckhart，　as“Nichts”identifiable　with　Buddhist　Emptiness）
which　is，　paradoxica皿y　enough，　the　source　of　creatio　continua　as　welL
Here　I　concur　with　Brian　Swimme　when　he　says：
The　universe　emerges　out　of　all－nourishing　abyss　not　only　fifteen
bi皿ion　years　ago　but　in　every　moment．　Each　instant　protons　and
antiprotons　are　flashing　out　of，　and　are　as　suddenly　absorbed　back
into，田一nourishing　abyss．　A皿一nourislmg　abyss　then　is　not　a　thing，
nor　a　collection　of　things，　nor　even，　strictly　speaking，　a　physical
place，　but　rather　a　power　that　gives　bi1電h　and　tllat　abso】tl）s　existence
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Iat　a血㎞9’S　amihiladOn．11
　　　　At　any　rate，　in　this　interpretation　of　Nishida’s　afbre－mentioned
dictum　I　am　based　upon　a　common　understanding　prevalent　among
Nishida　scholars　in　Japan　that　Nishida　came　to　radically　re－envision　his
earlier　philosophy　of　pure　experience　in　An　Inquiry　into　the　Good
（1911）from　his　new　perspective　appearing　in　the　second　volume，　as
containing　in　itself‘‘God’s　self－awareness”（i．e．，　regre∬us）as　this
paradoxically　gives　birth　to　the　emergence　of　the　universe（i．e．，
egre∬us）（s㏄IRS．141）．　It　is　important　to　recognize　here　that　his
practice　of　Zen　meditation（which　he　began　long　befbre　writing　his
maiden　work）is　now　giving　rise（although　only　through　the　radical　re－
envisioning　taking　place　in　the　second　volume）to　this　new
metaphysical　position　in　which　God　is　conceived　as，　I　might　say，重he
supreme　Zen　meditation　practitioner　on　a　cosmic　scale．
　　　　i1　sum，　there　are　three　stages　that　are　involved　in　the　problem　of
“creation”f沁m　my　perspective　of（責）d　as　the　principle　of　loyalty　in　the
unlverse：
（1）God’s　causality　presupposes　God’s　own　innermost
血trospection（which，　hhillk，　is　what　omnipotencelomniscience　is
all　abOut　for　Nishida）in　terms　of　what　1　call“GOd’s　loyalty　to　the
Godhead　as　this　is　unconditiona皿y　wi電h　us．”
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（2）But　why　so？Because　the　Godhead，　insofar　as　it　is　iden面able
with　Buddhist　Emptiness，　empties　itself．　That　is，　the　Godhead
never　wants　to　be　itself（i．e．，　Godhead　an　sich）etemally，　but　wants
to　cross　out　its　status　as　Emptiness　and　to　transfom　and　convert
itself　into　the　Godhead‘‘fbr　us，”namely，　the　personal　Deity　or
deus　creans－that　is，　the　Godhead‘‘as”God．
（3）It　is　fbr　this　reason　tllat　now　God（I　mean，　the　personal　Deity）
can　evoke　loyaltylfaithlworship　in　us　creatures－the　loyalty　as
embodied　in　the　se】lf－creative　activity　of　ours．
　　　　This　state　of　affairs　we　can　depict　i　l　more　precise　terms　from　the
perspective　of　process　conceptuality（as　it　is　concerned　with　the
problem　of“creation”）as　when　Wllitehead　writes　about‘‘envisagement
by　the　underlying　actiVity”as　follows：
Finally，　to　sum　up　this　train　of　thought，　the　underlying　activity
［cotem丘nous　with　llis　mature　notion　of　creativity］，　as　conceived
apart　ffom　the　fact　of　realization，　has　t㎞㏄types　of　envisagement．
These　aτe：flrst，　the　envisagement　of　etema16切㏄ts；s㏄ondly，　the
envisagement　of　possibi拙ties　of　value　in　respect　to　the　syntllesis　of
etemal　o切㏄ts；and　lastly，　the　envisagement　of　the　actual　ma伽r　of
侮ct　which　must　enter　into　the　total　situaはon　which　is　achievable
by　the　addition　of　the　fbture．12
To　me　the　third　case　of　envisagement　is　important；and　it　turns　out血at
血ere　are　three　stages　involved　herein：
（1）The　underlying　activity（in　my　case，　the　Godhead　an　sich）
envisages　the　actual　matter　of　fact（i．e．，　whatever　has　been
accomplished　alld　is　actual　in　the　universe　here－now）due，
paradoxically，　to　its　own　self－introspection．　At　this　vertical，
ontological　level　of　metaphysics　we　have　lots　of　tl血gs　to　leam
from　Nishida．
（2）The　envisagement　at　issue　here　covers　in　one　breath　the　area　of
the　accomplished　matter　of　act（i．e．，　the　primary　dative　pllase）
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entering　into　the　total　situation（which　is　the　situation　of　the
accomplished　matter　of　fact　plus　the　nascent　concrescence）．　Here
under　the　Pte－concrescent，　interim　phase　of　cleation，　it　is　ilnportant
to　recognize　anew　what　we　have　articu互ated　in　terms　of　the
Betw㏄n．
（3）The　total　situation　is　pardy　detennined　and　pa口rltly　indete］rlninate
because　it　is　finally　achievable　by　the　addition　of　the　f血tule（i．e．，
the　nascent　concrescence）．　Here　at　the　private　level　of　cn∋ation，
what　John　B．　Cobb，　Jr，　calls“the　One　Who　Ca皿s”13　is’　relevanち　in
the　sense　that　God　ca皿s　us　to　respOnd　to　the　mitial　a㎞s　provided
by　God　in　order　that　we　may　accomp血sh　ourselves　in　the　midst　of
our　task　of　self－creative　activity．
　　　　in　differentiating　while　at　the　same　time　uniting　these　three　phases
of　creation　we　can，　I　believe，　account　fbr　the　problem　of“creation”
cogently　enough．141n　The　Zero　Fa〃acy　and　Other　E∬ays　in
ハleoclassical　Philosophy　Charles　Hartshorne　says　that‘‘being　is　only　an
abs血action　from　becoming．，，15　But　from　our　Perspective　it　apPears　that
we　creatures　are　at　once　existential　alld　in　becoming，　or　that　we　are
envisagementally　determined　and　yet　free　as　the　subjects　of
conclescence．
　　　　In　my　op血ion，　we　cannot　be　ereative　without　being　primarily　and
食mdamentally‘‘with　God”under　our　primitive　dative　phase　f　rrst．　This　I
learnOd　from　my　teacher　Katsumi　Taldzawa’s　famous　d㏄血e　of　the
Proto－factum　lmmanuel．i6　And，㎞er，山e　Pm如伽舳as　its　own
inner　stnlcture　in　which　God　is　loyal　to　the　Godhead　qua　Emp血ess
emptying　itself，　thus，　and　only　thus，　paradoxically　tending　to　be
evocative　toward　us　creatUres．　This　is　my　own　thesis　by　which　I　think　I
can　unite　Taldzawa’s　d㏄血e　to　his　mentor　Nishida’s　idea　of　the　place
of　absolute　No血ingness．17
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